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STANDARDS AND CONFORMITY OF GOODS IN SALES LAW 
Djakhongir Saidov* 
 
Introduction 
 
Standards are a pervasive feature of modern life. Most products today have some corresponding 
standard(s) concerning a product’s composition, features, such as health and safety, or the 
process to be followed in making it. The standards are numerous, having different origins, 
ownership, character and functions. Some of them are adopted by states and often contained in 
public law regulations (‘public’ standards). Other standards are ‘private’ in the sense that they 
are produced by non-state bodies and organisations. These standards have proliferated greatly 
in the last two decades and play an important role in governing various aspects of goods and 
their production processes. This proliferation of standards has generated much discussion in 
legal and non-legal scholarship that addresses many aspects of standards, including their 
nature, content, functions, systematisation and classification, the relationship between private 
and public standards, their role in governing product quality and processes and their function 
of ‘regulating’ global supply chains. 
 Against this background, there has been surprisingly little discussion of the role and 
relevance of standards in the law of sale of goods. After all, the issue of ‘conformity’1 or 
‘quality’2 of goods, being one of the most highly litigated,3 occupies a central place in sales 
law; and it is with ‘conformity of goods’ that product standards are concerned. It is not the 
purpose of sales law to enforce standards because its task is to determine what the seller’s 
obligations are in respect of goods. However, given that both the rules on conformity in sales 
law and standards largely target the same subject-matter, standards can be highly relevant to 
the determination of the seller’s obligations and ultimately liability, arising from the contract 
of sale.  
                                                          
* Professor of Commercial Law, King’s College London. The author is very grateful to Professor Michael Bridge 
for his comments on an earlier draft. Any errors are the author’s own. 
All URLs were last accessed 15 December 2015. 
1 A convenient term often used in sales law to cover such aspects of the goods as quality, description, quantity or 
packaging. This is also how conformity is understood by the UN Sales Convention (Art 35(1)). 
2 An aspect of conformity.  
3 See CJ Murrow, ‘Warranty of Quality: A Comparative Survey’ (1940) 14 Tul L Rev 327; S Kröll, ‘The Burden 
of Proof of the Non-Conformity of Goods under Article 35 CISG’ (2011) 3 Belgrade L Rev 162; also n 232. 
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The specific question that this article examines is whether standards, public or private, 
should influence the interpretation of sales contracts and of the terms implied in sales law. This 
question, that has not been sufficiently addressed in the sales law scholarship, is important 
because the number and role of standards will only continue to increase, making the issue of 
their relationship with sales law more and more topical in the years to come. This article 
organises the thus far disparate discussions about standards within one framework and develops 
criteria and factors that will help understand and analyse a complex interaction between the 
interpretation of contracts and of terms implied in sales law, on the one hand, and public and 
private standards, on the other. 
The question, posed in the previous paragraph, will be examined in the context of 
several common law systems, such as those of the United Kingdom (UK), Canada and, to a 
lesser degree, the United States and Hong Kong, and of the UN Convention on Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods (CISG).4 All these sales law regimes have many similarities 
and common features, making it appropriate to integrate their experiences into one discussion. 
The Canadian common law provinces5 and the sales law of Hong Kong are modelled on the 
UK Sale of Goods Act 1893, which, in the UK, was replaced by the Sale of Goods Act 1979 
(SGA), with subsequent amendments having been made to the SGA, such as the replacement6 
of the ‘merchantable quality’ test with that of ‘satisfactory quality’. The statutes in the common 
law provinces in Canada and Hong Kong continue to use the merchantable quality test.7 
Decisions in one common law jurisdiction are also often taken into account by courts in 
another, producing a degree of legal convergence, including in matters of quality or conformity 
of goods. The US Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) uses similar tests of ‘merchantable 
quality’8 and of ‘fitness for purpose’, which is also provided for in statutes in other common 
law jurisdictions.9 The CISG uses a similar ‘fitness for purpose’ test10 and it is only its fall-
back implied term that differs more substantially from its common law counterpart tests of 
‘satisfactory’ or ‘merchantable’ quality. Instead, the CISG requires that goods be ‘fit for the 
purposes for which goods of the same description would ordinarily be used’.11 More generally, 
                                                          
4 The CISG has been ratified by 84 countries. The UK has not ratified it. 
5 Only the provisions of the Sale of Goods Act of the province of British Columbia ([RSBC 1996]) will be referred 
to because all Canadian cases relevant to this discussion have been decided in that province. 
6 By means of the Sale and Supply of Goods Act 1994. 
7 See n 86. 
8 See n 86. 
9 See n 81. 
10 See Art 35(2)(b). 
11 Art 35(2)(a). 
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what all these sales laws have in common is that determining the seller’s conformity or quality 
obligations is highly facts sensitive, with the terms implied in law providing a general 
framework for this purpose.  
Much of this article will thus focus on examining and evaluating the experience of the 
said sales laws in so far as it concerns public and private standards. However, given that sales 
laws govern quality and other aspects of goods in a very direct way in order to allocate risks 
between the two contracting parties, it may be asked whether the discourse on standards outside 
sales law should engage with the experience of sales laws. It will be suggested that indeed both 
sales law and the discussion of standards outside it would benefit from greater engagement 
with each other. Several areas where such mutual benefits will arise will be highlighted.   
  The article will begin by providing an introduction to standards and to the discourse 
on them outside sales law, to the extent that is relevant to this article. The next substantial part 
will analyse the interaction between sales law and standards. The following part will identify 
the areas where sales law and the discourse on standards outside it may produce mutual 
benefits. The final conclusions will be drawn at the end.   
 
I. Standards in modern trade 
 
There is no one universally accepted definition of a ‘standard’. Generally, it can be understood 
as a benchmark or a level of quality or attainment, with reference to which something is 
evaluated or the compliance with which is desirable or expected.12 Some leading standard 
setting organisations, such as the International Organisation for Standardization (ISO), define 
a standard as ‘a document that provides requirements, specifications, guidelines or 
characteristics that can be used consistently to ensure that materials, products, processes and 
services are fit for their purpose’.13 It is helpful to differentiate ‘public’  standards from ‘private’ 
ones. The former are adopted by state organisations and are often contained in public law 
regulations. They can also include those adopted by inter-governmental organisations, such the 
                                                          
12 See <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/standard>. 
13 See <http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards.htm>. 
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United Nations, International Labour Organisation or Codex Alimentarius Commission.14 
Public standards can be mandatory or voluntary. Other standards are ‘private’ in the sense that 
they are produced by non-state bodies and organisations. These can be: companies, adopting 
their own standards or codes of conduct, such as Tesco (Nature’s Choice);15 national industry 
bodies, such as the British Retail Consortium (BRC) and its BRC Global Standards;16 
international consortia of companies and their global standards, such as GlobalG.A.P. (‘Good 
Agricultural Practice’),17 the Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI)18 or the Equator Principles 
(EP) Association;19 international organisations that adopt standards across various industries 
and sectors, such as the ISO that adopts standards in a wide range of areas, including 
technology, food safety, agriculture, healthcare, environment;20 civil society, represented by 
non-profit non-governmental organisations (NGOs), such as the Fairtrade Foundation21 that 
promulgate what might called ‘ethical’ standards, concerning human rights, child labour and 
other labour standards, environmental protection, sustainability and corruption.  
Being adopted by non-state actors, private standards are voluntary. However, they can 
become mandatory or quasi-mandatory. The former is the case where a private standard is 
incorporated into a national regulatory framework.22 The example of the latter is where 
standards are applied by the majority of businesses in a particular sector and/or where 
compliance with such standards is required by a few large companies (usually, buyers) that 
dominate the sector.23 Companies in that sector may have no real choice but to comply with 
these standards in order to enter, remain in the market or carry on business effectively.24   
Standards and standardisation pursue a number of aims and objectives. Ethical 
standards, for example, aim to protect and promote social and human rights, combat such 
practices as child labour or bribery or protect environment. Standards of more technical nature 
define the composition and specifications of goods, ensure their compatibility and, essentially, 
                                                          
14 ‘The Codex Alimentarius was established by FAO and the World Health Organization in 1963 to develop 
harmonised international food standards, which protect consumer health and promote fair practices in food trade’ 
(<http://www.codexalimentarius.org/>). 
15 <http://www.tesco.com/csr/g/g4.html>. 
16 <http://www.brcglobalstandards.com/>. 
17 <http://www.globalgap.org/uk_en/who-we-are/about-us/>. 
18 <http://www.mygfsi.com/about-us/about-gfsi/what-is-gfsi.html>. 
19 <http://equator-principles.com/index.php/about-ep/governance-and-management>. 
20 <http://www.iso.org/iso/home/about.htm>. 
21 <http://www.fairtrade.org.uk/en/what-is-fairtrade/who-we-are>. 
22 See, eg, G Smith, ‘Interaction of Public and Private Standards in Food Chain’ (2009) OECD Food, Agriculture 
and Fisheries Working Papers No. 15, OECD Publishing, 32-33. 
23 See, eg, ibid, 24. 
24 Ibid. 
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lead to the situation where ‘buyers and suppliers have a common language to recognise and 
discuss quality issues’,25 with trade being thereby facilitated.26 Most standards today will be 
concerned with ensuring and promoting human and animal health and safety and the 
importance of this role is difficult to overestimate. By adhering to high standards, companies 
enhance their reputations,27 using standards as a competitive tool and a way of differentiating 
themselves from other companies. In the case of multinational companies (e.g., manufacturers 
or large retailers) that conduct their business through international supply chains,28 the adoption 
of certain standards necessitates measures to ensure that these standards are complied with in 
all contracts within a supply chain. Standards become a way of regulating supply chains and, 
to that extent, constitute a regulatory framework governing international trade.29 
 There are many benefits associated with standards and standardisation.30 They help 
manufacturers manage and rationalise the manufacturing process, reduce costs, including costs 
of negotiating contracts. They are valuable to traders and consumers in that they signal what 
can be expected of goods and provide certain assurances as regards quality and other aspects. 
By providing clear benchmarks of quality, standards can help settle disputes and avoid 
litigation. Since they necessarily provide some quality and other benchmarks, they are a useful 
platform for research and development into improving goods further. 
 It is in the last two decades that the world has seen proliferation of various standards, 
particularly private, and various standards setting organisations.31 There are a number of factors 
that have contributed to this development. First, since the 1990s, safety of products, and food 
safety in particular, has been a concern in Western countries, following major food crises, such 
                                                          
25 S Henson and J Humphrey, ‘Understanding the Complexities of Private Standards in Global Agri-Food Chains’, 
<https://www.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/HensonHumphreyLeuvenOct08.pdf>, 9. 
26 See further N Brunsson, ‘Organizations, Markets and Standardization’ in N Brunsson and B Jacobsson, A World 
of Standards (OUP 2002) 21; N Brunsson and B Jacobsson, ‘The Contemporary Expansion of Standardization’ 
in Brunsson and Jacobsson, A World of Standards (n 26) 10. 
27 See, eg, L Fulponi, ‘Private Voluntary Standards in the Food System: The Perspectives of Major Food Retailers 
in OECD Countries’ (2006) 31 Food Policy 1, 5. 
28 Supply chain can be defined as the ‘series of companies, including suppliers, customers, and logistics providers 
which work together to deliver a value package of goods and services to the end consumer’ (see A Rümkorf, 
Corporate Social Responsibility, Private Law and Global Supply Chains (Edward Elgar 2015) 79) 
29 See, eg, P Liu, ‘Private Standards in International Trade: Issues and Opportunities’, 
<http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/est/AG_MARKET_ANALYSIS/Standards/Private_standards___Trad
e_Liu_WTO_wkshp.pdf>, 2. 
30 See, generally, United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), Role of Standards: A Guide for 
Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises, Working Paper, 2006, 
<https://www.unido.org/fileadmin/media/documents/pdf/tcb_role_standards.pdf >, 5. 
31 See International Trade Centre, The Interplay of Public and Private Standards: Literature Review Series on the 
Impacts of Private Standards – Part III (Geneva: ITC, 2011) 15, 
<https://www.unido.org/fileadmin/media/documents/pdf/tcb_role_standards.pdf>. 
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as the mad cow disease.32 As a result, many governments have strengthened regulatory 
frameworks to tackle real and/or perceived safety risks and placed responsibility on firms to 
ensure food safety for consumers.33 The private sector has responded by adopting its own 
standards to ensure food safety and avoid or reduce potential liability under the applicable 
regulatory framework.34 Secondly, there has been a large increase in a consumer’s interest in 
and awareness of not only matters of product safety but also ethical aspects of the production 
process.35 Thirdly, this consumer interest has been reinforced by companies who have 
developed their competitive strategies with reference to environmental, social and other ethical 
considerations.36 Fourthly, the last decades have also witnessed the growth of civil society that 
contributed substantially to the emergence of ethical standards.37 Fifthly, there has been 
globalisation of supply chains38 with Western companies increasingly outsourcing parts of their 
production processes to developing and transition economies.39 Business activities within these 
supply chains must be co-ordinated and standards and standardisation have become a major 
way through which multinational companies regulate their supply chains.  
 The latter factor, together with others such as a lack of resources and technical expertise 
to deal with increasing complexity of standards on a public level,40 has resulted in what many 
perceive as the shift from public to private market governance.41 In other words, it is private 
standards, incorporated into contracts within global supply chains, that largely govern quality 
of goods and their production processes. It is also widely reported that private standards often 
tend to be higher, more rigorous and flexible than their public counterparts.42 The two sets of 
                                                          
32 E Giraud-Héraud et al, ‘Joint Private Safety Standards and Vertical Relationships in Food Retailing’ (2012) 21 
J Economics Management Strategy 179. 
33 See, eg, the UK Food Safety Act 1990, in particular ss. 7, 8, 14-15. See further Henson and Humphrey (n 25) 
5; Giraud-Héraud et al (n 32) 180. 
34 Under the UK Food Safety Act 1990, proving that a person charged with an offence ‘took all reasonable 
precautions and exercise all due diligence to avoid the commission of the offence by himself or by a person under 
his control’ is a defence to the charge of an offence (s 21(1)). The implementation of private standards is seen as 
‘one major tool to assure due diligence and signal that firms are taking all reasonable precautions to prevent 
incidents from occurring’ (Giraud-Héraud et al (n 32) 180). 
35 See, eg, Henson and Humphrey (n 25) 5. 
36 See J Wouters and D Geraets, ‘Private Food Standards and the World Trade Organization: Some Legal 
Considerations’ [2012] World Trade Rev 479, 480.  
37 See, eg, Fulponi (n 27) 3. 
38 See, eg, Henson and Humphrey (n 25) 5; Wouters and Geraets (n 36) 480. 
39 See Rümkorf (n 28) 79. 
40 See, eg, International Trade Centre (n 31) 15. 
41 See, eg, Henson and Humphrey (n 25) 5; LC Backer, ‘Multinational Corporations as Objects and Sources of 
Transnational Regulation’ (2008) ILSA J Int’l Comparative L 499, 505. 
42 See, eg, International Trade Centre (n 31) 20; Giraud-Héraud et al (n 32) 182. 
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standards, however, are mutually reinforcing and complementary.43 Public standards are 
necessary not just because it is the state that ultimately bears responsibility for public safety44 
but also because public standards are needed ‘to correct market failures associated with 
information assymetries or consumption externalities and where standards have clearly public 
good characteristics’.45 They sometimes trigger or provide the basis for the development of 
private standards.46 The latter are useful, as far as public regulation is concerned, because 
private standards can perform the regulatory function where public standards are either weak 
or absent.47  
The proliferation of various standards has had many ramifications, generating much 
discussion in non-legal and legal literature. This is not a place to summarise the entire multi-
faceted discourse on standards. Only those areas that are relevant to the present discussion will 
be noted. For example, much discussion has focused on the nature, content, systematisation 
and classification of private standards and their relationship with public standards.48 Private 
standards are not free from controversy and there is a debate about whether they are an obstacle 
to or catalyst of international trade, about their legitimacy,49 impact on international trade and 
on developing countries. One concern regarding their legitimacy is that their development does 
not involve the required level of transparency, public and legal scrutiny.50 Another is that 
private standards can be driven by self-interest of a body, setting the standard. Considering that 
they increasingly take on the role akin to public regulation, the approach based on the pursuit 
of self-interest cannot be the right way of regulating products and the production processes, 
which should reflect common goals and public interest.51  
Developing countries, where most parts of supply chains are located, are also concerned 
by the fact that in reality their businesses become bound by standards that originate from the 
developed world. These can be standards based on laws and regulations in developed countries; 
this happens where multinational companies incorporate the requirement to comply with the 
                                                          
43 See Y Naiki, ‘The Dynamics of Private Food Safety Standards: A Case Study on The Regulatory Diffusion of 
GlobalG.A.P.’ (2014) 63 ICLQ 146. 
44 See International Trade Centre (n 31) 17. 
45 Smith (n 22) 6. 
46 See, eg, Liu (n 29) 14; Smith (n 22) 6. 
47 See Smith (n 22) 6, suggesting also that in certain circumstances private standards can ‘act to facilitate 
compliance with public standards to allow for better targeting of scarce compliance resources’. 
48 See sources referred to throughout this section. 
49 For a helpful overview of the debate and further references, see Naiki (n 43) 146-148. 
50 See, eg, Naiki (n 43) 146. 
51 See, eg, Naiki (n 43) 146-148. 
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laws of their home countries into all contracts within a supply chain.52 Alternatively, these can 
be private standards, adopted by the dominant company in the chain or by a consortium of 
companies. Developing countries play a small role in developing these standards. Crucially, 
the costs and burdens of compliance are substantial, whilst non-compliance can lead to the 
exclusion from international markets, loss of earnings and access to expertise and technology.53 
 Another major theme, surrounding private standards, has been their extensive 
incorporation in contracts, often of standard form, within supply chains. As noted, 
multinational companies, usually acting as the end-buyers, often rely on supply chains, 
constructed as a series of contracts, in order to deliver a final product to the market. Using their 
dominant position, these companies require their suppliers to comply with specified 
standards.54 To ensure such compliance, the suppliers incorporate these requirements in 
contracts with their own suppliers and these requirements are eventually contractually imposed 
on all parties upstream. The result is a supply chain, consisting of series of bilateral contracts, 
based on standards dictated by the dominant end-buyer. The ways these chains operate are well 
documented in many case studies that explain the operation of supply chains used by large 
multinational companies in retail, food and manufacturing sectors, such as GAP,55 Wal-Mart56 
or IKEA.57  
 Many have argued that contracts, incorporating various standards, within global supply 
chains have turned into ‘transnational regulatory regimes’,58 that in practice ‘operate as a 
substitute for public regulation’.59 First, the incorporation of human rights, labour or 
environmental standards means that contracts seek to produce effects far beyond the parties to 
                                                          
52 This trend is only likely to increase. See, eg, the recent UK Modern Slavery Act 2015 requiring businesses 
with a commercial presence in the UK and a specified total turnover threshold (£36 million) to prepare a slavery 
and human trafficking statement for each financial year, setting out steps taken by an organisation to ‘ensure that 
slavery and human trafficking is not taking place – (i) in any of its supply chains, and (ii) in any part of its own 
business’ or providing that the organisation ‘has taken no such steps’ (s 54(4)). 
53 Liu (n 29) 17. 
54 See, eg, the statement by Philip Morris International: ‘We require each of our suppliers to follow our [Good 
Agricultural Practices] program which is designed to enable us to assess the farming processes of our suppliers 
and to identify opportunities for improvement’ 
(<http://www.pmi.com/eng/about_us/how_we_operate/pages/good_agricultural_practices.aspx>). 
55 See Backer (n 41). 
56 See LC Backer, ‘Economic Globalization and the Rise of Efficient Systems of Global Private Law Making: 
Wal-Mart as Global Legislator’ (2007) 39 Connecticut L Rev 1741. 
57 ER Pedersen and M Andersen, ‘Safeguarding Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in Global Supply Chains: 
How Codes of Conduct are Managed in Buyer-Supplier Relationships’ (2006) 6 J Public Affairs 228. 
58 See, eg, F Cafaggi, ‘The Regulatory Functions of Transnational Commercial Contracts: New Architectures’ 
(2013) 36 Fordham Int’l L J 1557, 1566; Backer (n 56) 1783. 
59 See F Cafaggi, ‘New Foundations of Transnational Private Regulation’ (2011) 38 J L Society 20, 48. 
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a given contract.60 Secondly, because the incorporation of standards in contracts does not 
guarantee compliance, dominant parties in a chain, together with their immediate suppliers, 
usually resort to the internal and external auditing and certification mechanisms.61 Either the 
dominant party’s own auditors or those employed externally, including NGOs, are entrusted to 
investigate the immediate supplier’s compliance with the relevant standards as well as that of 
other parties in the chain. Where the immediate supplier’s non-compliance with a standard is 
detected, the dominant party can resort to remedies for breach of contract against the supplier.62 
As a whole, though, the monitoring schemes are seen as ‘intrusive as any created by 
governments’63 and ‘resemble more the form of legislative or administrative management 
under public law codes’.64 
   
II. Standards and sales law 
 
A. Legal framework  
 
Before exploring the response of sales law to standards, it is necessary to set out the relevant 
legal framework in the common law systems and in the CISG. Freedom of contract is the 
underlying principle in all of them65 and where the contract expressly provides that the seller 
must comply with a certain standard, that will normally constitute a seller’s contractual 
obligation.66 Not every statement in relation to the goods will, however, constitute a seller’s 
contractual obligation.67 A statement will only amount to a contractual obligation, if it was so 
intended by the parties. Such an intention is to be inferred from the surrounding 
                                                          
60 Cafaggi (n 58) 1565. 
61 See, eg, L Lin, ‘Legal Transplants Through Private Contracting: Codes of Vendor Conduct in Global Supply 
Chains as an Example’ (2009) 57 American J Comparative L 711, 723-724. 
62 Cafaggi (n 58) 1604. 
63 Backer (n 41) 518. 
64 Ibid; also Cafaggi (n 58) 1604. For the argument that the ‘contractualisation of regulatory provisions’ has 
widened legal avenues for claiming against various parties in a chain, see Cafaggi (n 58) 1604. 
65 See, eg, Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] AC 827, 848. See also CISG, Arts 6 and 35(1). 
66 See, eg, Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd (n 65) 848.  
67 The common law subsumes statements into: misrepresentations, inducing a party to enter into a contract; 
contractual promises that are terms of the main contract; contractual promises that are separate from the main 
contract (collateral contract); statements non-compliance with which will not trigger legal liability, such as mere 
puffs or statements of opinion or intention (see, generally, M Bridge (ed), Benjamin’s Sale of Goods (9th edn, 
Sweet & Maxwell-Thomson Reuters 2014) paras 10-001-10-023).  
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circumstances,68 with the relevant factors including the nature of a statement,69 its importance 
to the parties, the time when it was made,70 or the balance of the parties’ expertise in and 
knowledge of the characteristic, to which the statement relates.71 In the common law, the 
interpretation of the parties’ intentions is to be done ‘objectively’, ‘by asking whether the other 
party assumed, and a reasonable person in his position would have assumed, that the 
representor was to be regarded as undertaking legal liability for his assertions’.72 Under the 
CISG, the representor’s actual intention is relevant only if the other party ‘knew or could not 
have been unaware what that intent was’.73 Otherwise - and this is the most common situation 
– the test is also objective: ‘statements made by and other conduct of a party are to be 
interpreted according to the understanding that a reasonable person of the same kind as the 
other party would have had in the same circumstances’.74  
 It may be that a seller has made no statements about the goods, but the question may 
still be whether the contracting parties have implicitly intended that the goods have certain 
characteristics or that a certain process be observed in their production. In such a case, a term 
can be implied into the contract from the circumstances (implication in fact). In the common 
law, a traditional approach is that a term will be implied if it is an obvious inference from the 
agreement,75 or if it is necessary to make the contract work76 - that is to say, to give it business 
efficacy or commercial or practical coherence.77 Although the relevant tests under the CISG 
are formulated with less precision,78 there is little doubt that the same essential character of a 
                                                          
68 See CISG, Art 8(3) (‘In determining the intent of a party or the understanding a reasonable person would have 
had, due consideration is to be given to all relevant circumstances of the case including the negotiations, any 
practices which the parties have established between themselves, usages and any subsequent conduct of the 
parties’). 
69 For example, whether the language is one of puffery or merely reflecting an opinion. 
70 The closer to the conclusion to the contract, the more likely it may be that the statement was intended to 
constitute a seller’s obligation (warranty) and vice versa (see, generally, M Bridge, The Sale of Goods (3rd edn, 
OUP 2014) para 8.11). 
71 See, generally, ibid paras 8.09-8.15. For a detailed discussion in the context of the CISG, see D. Saidov, 
Conformity of Goods and Documents - The Vienna Sales Convention (Hart Publishing 2015) 29-43. 
72 Benjamin (n 67) 10-017. 
73 CISG, Art 8(1). 
74 CISG, Art 8(2). 
75 See eg, Shirlaw v Southern Foundries (1926) Ltd [1939] 2 KB 206. 
76 See, eg, The Moorcock (1889) 14 PD 64.  
77 Marks and Spencer plc v BNP Paribas Securities Services Trust Company (Jersey) Ltd [2015] UKSC 72, para 
[21]. But see Attorney General of Belize v Belize Telecom Limited [2009] UKPC 10, where these traditional tests 
were treated as guidelines in answering one central question: ‘what the instrument, read as a whole against the 
relevant background, would reasonably be understood to mean?’ (para [21]).   
78 Because any implication of a term is part of the contract interpretation process, with the same rules applying in 
both cases (see nn 73-74 and the accompanying main text). In English law, it has been debated whether implication 
of a term is a process separate from contract interpretation; compare Marks and Spencer plc v BNP Paribas 
Securities Services Trust Company (Jersey) Ltd (n 77) paras [25]-[28] (Lord Neuberger) with Attorney General 
of Belize v Belize Telecom Limited (n 77), para [18] (Lord Hoffmann).  
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term must, similarly, be demonstrated for it to be implied into a contract governed by the 
CISG.79 
 A term can also be implied in law from the relevant statute, Convention or code 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘statutory implied terms’ (SITs) or ‘terms implied in law’).80 These 
terms are broadly similar in the common law and the CISG. According to s. 14(3) of the UK 
SGA, if the buyer makes known to the seller any ‘particular purpose for which the goods are 
being bought, there is an implied term that the goods supplied under the contract are reasonably 
fit for that purpose’. Other common law jurisdictions and the CISG contain a similar, although 
not an identical, ‘fitness for purpose’ test.81 There is a close link between this test and the 
implication of terms in fact because the communication of a particular purpose to the seller can 
often be categorised as a term of the contract implied (in fact) from the circumstances.82 
Nevertheless, as far as the buyer is concerned, it is a strength of the fitness for purpose test that 
it does not require proving that the alleged particular purpose is a contractual term. Establishing 
that this purpose was duly made known to the seller suffices to impose an obligation.83   
All sales laws have a fall-back test, such as the SGA’s test of ‘satisfactory quality’ that 
requires goods which ‘a reasonable person would regard as satisfactory, taking into account of 
any description of the goods, the price (if relevant) and all the other relevant circumstances’.84 
One important aspect of quality under SGA is, in appropriate cases, the goods’ ‘fitness for all 
the purposes for which goods of the kind in question are commonly supplied’.85 Other common 
                                                          
79 See further Saidov (n 71) 29-43. 
80 If a contract specifies a standard with which the goods must comply, this may be deemed to be a sale of goods 
by description. In this case, the SGA and other common law statutes based on the SGA imply a term that goods 
must correspond with description, that is, with the specified standard. See SGA, section 13; Sale of Goods Act, 
RSBC 1996, section 17; the Sale of Goods Ordinance, Hong Kong, section 15. See also n 98 and the accompanying 
main text. 
81 See, eg, UCC, §2-315; Sale of Goods Act, RSBC 1996, section 18(a): ‘(a) if the buyer…, expressly or by 
implication, makes known to the seller…the particular purpose for which the goods are required, so as to show 
that the buyer…relies on the seller's…skill or judgment, and the goods are of a description that it is in the course 
of the seller's …business to supply, whether the seller…is the manufacturer or not, there is an implied condition 
that the goods are reasonably fit for that purpose’; the Sale of Goods Ordinance, Hong Kong, section 16(3); CISG, 
Art 35(2)(b). 
82 In the context of the CISG, see Saidov (n 71) 72-74. In the common law, the linkage between contract 
interpretation and the fitness for purpose tests is also evidenced by the expansion of the latter’s scope reducing 
the impact of the law on express warranties (see Bridge (n 70) para 7.89). 
83 However, in the UK law and the CISG, the seller can prevent such an obligation from arising if the buyer did 
not rely or it was unreasonable for it to rely on the seller’s skill and judgment. In some other common law systems, 
the duty to comply with a particular purpose will be established if it was communicated so as to show that the 
buyer relies on the seller’s skill and judgment (see n 81). The latter approach seems to set a higher threshold for 
the buyer. On the whole, however, the skill and judgment provision makes the threshold for implying a term in 
fact and implying a term under the fitness for purpose test somewhat similar.  
84 SGA, section 14(2A). 
85 Section 14(2B)(a). See further section 14(2B)(b), (c), (d), (e). 
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law jurisdictions rely on the ‘merchantable quality’ test,86 which was also used in the UK87 but, 
as noted, replaced with that of ‘satisfactory quality’. The emphasis in the application of the 
merchantable quality test has traditionally been on the goods’ ability to be ‘commercially 
saleable’ under the contract description,88 without abatement of the price if a buyer knew about 
the actual state and condition of the goods.89 Another related element of this test is that it is 
sufficient that the goods are suitable for one or more, but not all, purposes for which the goods 
are normally bought under that description.90 The CISG does not rely on a test of ‘quality’ and 
instead uses the fitness for the ordinary use test.91 There is often considerable overlap between 
these fall-back tests and the fitness for purpose test, particularly if the latter concerns normal 
or ordinary purposes that are typically covered by the former. It is where fitness for purpose 
concerns an unusual, abnormal or idiosyncratic purpose, that the two tests become truly 
distinctive. Fitness for purpose would then lead to a higher standard being imposed on the 
seller.92  
  
B. Public standards 
 
Whilst standards are set at different levels and by different bodies, the national level remains 
very important.93 It is the prerogative of the state to define and protect the interests of the public. 
Governments are the ones primarily responsible for setting and enforcing standards, relating to 
health, safety, environment or other ethical considerations,94 and more generally for advancing 
socially desirable goals. Therefore, the vast majority of countries have in place a myriad of 
public law regulations, concerning various human and business activities. As far as sales law 
                                                          
86 See UCC, §2-314; Sale of Goods Act, RSBC 1996, section 18(b) (‘if goods are bought by description from a 
seller…who deals in goods of that description, whether the seller …is the manufacturer or not, there is an implied 
condition that the goods are of merchantable quality’); the Sale of Goods Ordinance, Hong Kong, section 16(2). 
87 See the original Sale of Goods Act of 1893, section 14(2). 
88 See, eg, Henry Kendall & Sons v William Lillico & Sons Ltd [1969] 2 AC 31, 74-79 (Lord Reid). 
89 Australian Knitting Mills v Grant (1933) 50 CLR 387, 413. 
90 See, eg, M/S Aswan Engineering Establishment Co v Lupdine Ltd [1987] 1 WLR 1, 12. 
91 See n 11 and the accompanying main text.  
92 See Benjamin (n 67) para [11-071]. For the relationship between the two tests under the CISG, see Saidov (n 
71) 110-111. 
93 ‘It is at the national level that the standardization requirements of individuals, companies and the industry are 
coordinated and integrated into purposeful national standards’ (UNIDO (n 30) 9). 
94 See, eg, n 44 and the accompanying main text. See also I Schwenzer and B Leisinger, ‘Ethical Values and 
International Sales Contracts’ in R Cranston, J Ramberg and J Ziegel (eds), Commercial Law Challenges in the 
21st Century, Jan Hellner in Memorium (Stockholm Centre for Commercial Law Juridiska Institutionen 2007) 
252, making this point in relation to ethical standards. 
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is concerned, its primary function is to allocate risks and liabilities between the contracting 
parties. It is not its task to enforce public standards. Nevertheless, considering that public 
standards often concern the goods and their various features, which, in the eyes of sales law, 
constitute an issue of ‘conformity’ or ‘quality’, the question arises as to what the relationship 
between public standards and the rules of sales law is.  
 To what extent will the interpretation of a sales contract and of SITs be influenced by 
public standards? Where the contract expressly requires the seller to comply with the specified 
public standards, that will normally be sufficient to put the seller in breach of contract if such 
standards are not complied with. A contract may lack such an express provision, but may still 
contain formulations that reflect the parties’ intention to comply with public standards in a 
place where goods are intended to be used. In Taurus Importgesellschaft J Seebohm MBH v 
Wide Loyal Industries Ltd,95 a case decided in Hong Kong, a contract for the sales of ropelights 
by a Hong Kong seller to a German buyer provided that the ropelights were to be ‘CE 
Approved’. The German authorities discovered that the ropelights contained levels of 
cadmium, exceeding those allowed by German Law in accordance with the European 
Community (EC) Directives, and prohibited their sale. The court96 held that although ‘CE 
Approved’ was only ‘a placed mercantile or trade term and not a legal term used either in the 
European Community Directives or even in German Law’,97 the seller had committed a breach 
of contract.98 Before the contract was made, the seller had presented itself as an international 
supplier of ropelights and displayed its various certifications, including CE certification. These 
factors caused the buyer to engage and make a contract with the seller. Knowing that the goods 
would be sold in Germany and that the CE mark had to be affixed to the goods, the seller had 
a contractual obligation, according to the decision, to comply with all the EC Directives99 that 
prohibited products with the cadmium content exceeding the prescribed level. The court 
accepted evidence that the CE mark was a ‘passport into Europe’ and held that ‘[w]ithout full 
compliance with all the relevant directives, it is difficult to see how it can be “a passport into 
Europe” for the products involved’.100 
                                                          
95 [2009] HKEC 1236. 
96 The Court of First Instance of the High Court of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. 
97 Para [66]. 
98 And a breach of SITs of correspondence with description (the CE marking was treated as part of description 
(para [79]); see the Sale of Goods Ordinance, Hong Kong, section 15) and merchantable quality (since the goods 
were not marketable in Germany (para [85])). 
99 And not just those concerning ropelights. 
100 Para [71]. 
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The real difficulties of interpretation arise where there is no relevant contractual 
provision. This obligation can then only be inferred by implying a term in fact or in law. As an 
example of the former, take a CISG case101 that concerned a sale of wheat flour by a Dutch 
seller to a Belgian buyer for further resale to Mozambique. The seller had added a substance 
containing potassium bromate, capable of causing cancer and damaging DNA structures, to the 
flour which upon delivery to Mozambique was confiscated by the authorities. There was 
evidence that the import of flour enriched with potassium bromate was de facto permitted in 
Mozambique and that a company appointed by the Mozambican government had tested the 
batches of wheat before shipment and had issued a Clean Report for the purpose of an import 
licence. The seller was held liable largely because of the ban on potassium bromate in the 
Netherlands and in the EU, of which the seller was aware, and under the Codex Alimentarius,102 
an international public standard, which both the Netherlands and Mozambique have agreed to 
use and which was regarded by the court as the ‘appropriate general standard’. The court also 
rejected the argument that the import of such goods to Mozambique was de facto permitted. 
Accepting this argument would mean that: 
products unfit for human consumption could be delivered without contractual sanction 
by a seller from a highly developed country to a purchaser from a less developed 
country, who - due to the contract - may rightfully expect to have delivered to him a 
product that is reliable according to international standards and fit for human 
consumption.103  
 Non-compliance with public standards can lead to the conclusion that SITs have been 
breached. In a UK case, Lowe v W Machell Joinery Ltd,104 the buyer ordered from the seller a 
bespoke wooden staircase to be installed in the buyer’s barn. The seller complied with the 
design, agreed between the parties, but the staircase did not comply with the applicable 
Building Regulations.105 The majority of the Court of Appeal106 held the seller liable107 under 
both the satisfactory quality and fitness for purpose tests,108 even though the buyer was 
                                                          
101 Appellate Court’s-Gravenhage, 99/474, 23 April 2003 (Netherlands) 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/030423n1.html>. 
102 See n 14. 
103 Ibid, point 8. 
104 [2011] EWCA Civ 794. 
105 Issued under the Building Act 1984.  
106 Rix LJ dissenting. 
107 Para [38]. 
108 The particular purpose being the goods being installed and used as the staircase in the barn, converted for 
residential use.  
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responsible for obtaining approval under the Building Regulations.109 Similarly, in Woodbury 
Chemical Company v Don Holgerson,110 a US case, a failure of weed killer to accomplish 
sagebrush kill, required by government specifications, was a factor in holding a chemical 
company liable to an aerial applicator of herbicides for breach of an implied term of fitness for 
purpose. It can be argued that by interpreting SITs with reference to public standards, SITs 
become conduit for implementing public regulation.111  
 The previous two cases show that where contracting parties operate in the same country 
or within the same regulatory framework, the seller is usually expected to comply with the 
applicable public standards, especially where it has the relevant experience and expertise. 
Where, however, contracting parties are from different countries, the extent of influence of 
public standards on the interpretation of contract and of SITs should arguably depend on 
whether the seller is in a position to know about such standards and the need to comply with 
them, in a place where the buyer intended to use or sell the goods. Where this knowledge cannot 
be implied to the seller, the common law and the CISG have placed the risk of non-compliance 
with public standards on the buyer, even where the seller knew the country in which the goods 
were intended to be used or sold.112  
This risk allocation is fair and reasonable because, in general, the buyer is in a better 
position than the seller to know about any standards that the goods must or are expected to 
meet in a place where the buyer (or its sub-buyers) intends to use or sell the goods. If the 
position were otherwise, sellers would probably have to increase prices to pass to their buyers 
additional costs of taking measures to address the risk of their potential liability.113 As a result, 
commerce and trade would become more expensive, contravening the basic purpose of 
commercial law of facilitating trade by reducing transaction costs. However, the seller should 
be liable where it is in a position to know about the public standards and the need to comply 
with them in a place of the intended use or sale. As held in a leading CISG case,114 this 
                                                          
109 The point that troubled Rix LJ in his dissenting judgment (see para [108]). 
110 439 F.2d 1052. 
111 See further D Saidov, ‘Quality Control, Public Law Regulations and the Implied Terms of Quality’ [2015] 
LMCLQ 491, 500-505. 
112 See Sumner Permain & Co v Webb & Co [1922] 1 KB 55 (merchantable quality); Phoenix Distributors Ltd v 
L B Clarke (London) Ltd [1967] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 518 (no breach of contract and of merchantable quality and fitness 
for purpose tests); Supreme Court, 8 March 1995, VIII ZR 159/94 (Germany) 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950308g3.html> (no breach of the fitness for purpose and for ordinary use tests 
under the CISG).  
113 Such as costs of drafting the exclusion or limitation of liability clauses or investing in researching public 
standards in places where the goods will be used or sold. 
114 Supreme Court, 8 March 1995 (Germany) (n 112) 
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knowledge may be attributed to the seller where: the standards are the same in the seller’s 
country; the buyer specifically drew the seller’s attention to the regulations;115 the seller had a 
good reason to know about the standards, such as where the seller had a branch in the buyer’s 
country, had a long established business relationship with the buyer or often previously 
exported the goods to or promoted them in that country.116  
There are other factors that will be relevant to determining whether the seller could be 
expected to know about and comply with public standards in a place of the intended use or sale 
of the goods, such as: the balance of the parties’ expertise in relation to the goods;117 the contract 
price;118 the level of complexity of the relevant standards and whether the country in question 
is a federal state where the authorities in different administrative-territorial units use different 
standards;119 the identity and characteristics of the seller120 and the buyer121; the ease of access 
to the information, regarding the standards;122 the consideration of how well-known the 
standards are;123 the existence of a trade usage or a practice between the parties to follow a 
particular standard; the buyer being closely involved in designing the goods and advising the 
seller as to the manufacturing process;124 the seller’s pre- and post-contractual representations.
  Factors, such as these, are to be balanced against one other in each case. The result will 
depend on the weight of which factors will prevail. For instance, whilst a long-standing 
relationship with the buyer was identified as a factor pointing to the seller’s knowledge in one 
CISG case,125 in another CISG case,126 the seller was not held liable despite a long-standing 
relationship with the buyer. In the latter case, the Dutch seller had not only known that the 
mobile units would be used in Germany but had also been informed by the buyer that the 
German authorities had issued requirements in respect of such mobile units. Nevertheless, the 
                                                          
115 In which case the fitness for purpose standard would normally be triggered. 
116 For a more comprehensive discussion, see Saidov (n 71) 52-59, 80-86, 134-142. 
117 See n 126 and the accompanying main text. 
118 Which can be so high (or low) so as to signal a reasonable expectation that the goods will (or will not) comply 
with high quality standards, embodied in the relevant regulations. 
119 See n 126 and the accompanying main text. 
120 If the seller is a large multinational company, it may be reasonable to expect this seller to investigate the 
standards at a place of the intended use or sale of the goods.  
121 The buyer’s well-known reputation for high quality products can communicate to the seller that the goods were 
expected to comply with high standards, such as those underlying the relevant regulations. 
122 Easy accessibility on the internet and/or availability in an accessible language may point to the conclusion that 
the seller could be reasonably expected to be aware of and comply with the standards. 
123 The more well-known they are, the more can the seller be expected to comply with them (see the above CISG 
case (n 101)). 
124 In which case, the seller may not be liable for non-compliance with those aspects, on which the buyer has 
advised the seller. 
125 See n 114 and the accompanying main text. 
126 Appellate Court Arnhem, 97/700 and 98/046, 27 April 1999 (Netherlands) 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/990427n1.html>.  
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fact that both parties had equal expertise in the manufacture of mobile units and that German 
states imposed different construction requirements meant that, on balance, the buyer had 
superior access to the information and the seller did not have a duty to comply with the 
applicable standards in Germany.  
 Finally, to what extent should the fact that public standards can be voluntary or 
mandatory127 influence the legal analysis? It is submitted that this difference in nature is neither 
irrelevant nor decisive. The nature of standards is part of the factual background against which 
the parties’ reasonable expectations and SITs are interpreted. The mandatory character 
normally indicates to a reasonable person in the parties’ position that the goods cannot be used 
or sold, unless they are standard compliant. Therefore, the starting point is that the mandatory 
character is a factor pointing to the seller having an obligation to comply with the standard.  
However, it may be that a standard, whilst formally mandatory, is not enforced strictly 
in practice. In this case, the parties may not have reasonably expected that the seller would 
comply with it. In Bramhill v Edwards, a UK case,128 non-compliance of a vehicle with the 
requirements as to width under the applicable Regulations was not held to be a breach of the 
satisfactory quality test in s.14(2) SGA, because in practice such vehicles were still able to be 
insured and the authorities did not enforce the regulations strictly, which meant that there was 
no real risk of prosecution.129 Similarly, the fact that a standard is voluntary does not mean that 
the seller has committed no breach. Such a standard may be so well-known and established that 
compliance with it is generally expected in the relevant sector or market. Non-compliance may 
lead to reputational damage and/or loss of business. In this context, a voluntary standard is 
likely to carry the same weight as that normally attributed to a mandatory standard, influencing 
the interpretation of contract and SITs in the buyer’s favour.130  
 
C. Private standards 
 
                                                          
127 See, eg, Smith (n 22) 14. 
128 [2004] EWCA Civ 403. 
129 See, similarly, Activa DPS Europe SARL v Pressure Seal Solutions Limited T/A Welltec System (UK) [2012] 
EWCA Civ 943. 
130 Another reason where a voluntary standard can be interpreted in this manner is where it is clear that its 
voluntary character is temporary, it being inevitable that it will become mandatory. See Hazlewood Grocery Ltd 
v Lion Foods Ltd [2007] EWHC 1887 (QB). 
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1. Technical standards 
  
Compliance or non-compliance of goods with a technical standard will not necessarily make 
the seller immune from a claim that the goods are non-conforming or make the seller liable, 
respectively. Whether goods are non-conforming depends on the circumstances, surrounding 
the contract. It is always open to the parties to expressly specify in their contract a standard 
with which the seller must comply. Where this is the case and the goods do not comply with 
this standard, the seller is in breach of contract.131 The reverse, however, is not always true. It 
may be that the seller has complied with the standard specified in the contract, but the issues, 
raised by the buyer in its lack of conformity claim, fall outside the scope of the standard. In 
this case, the seller may still fail to comply with SITs that will be applicable, if they are not 
deemed excluded by the parties.132 For example, in Messer UK Ltd v Britvic Soft Drinks Ltd, a 
UK case,133 the seller supplied carbon dioxide, contaminated with benzene, to the buyers who 
used it in the manufacture of sparkling drinks. The levels of contamination were low and 
insufficient to make the goods pose danger to health and safety, with which the contractually 
incorporated standard (British Standard (BS) 4105) was concerned. Nevertheless, the presence 
of benzene was enough to influence public perception, making the goods unsaleable and 
damaging the buyer’s reputation. For these reasons, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judge’s 
decision that the seller had breached the s. 14 implied terms of the SGA.134  
 More difficult cases are those where the contract does not expressly incorporate a 
standard. Is the seller in breach of contract or of SITs, if the goods do not comply with a 
standard? The interpretation of contract and of SITs, particularly in matters of conformity, is 
highly facts sensitive and there can be no hard and fast answer. The openness of sales laws to 
the facts means that a relevant standard will be taken into account. It is submitted that where it 
                                                          
131 The contract may formulate the seller’s obligations with reference to general standards, such as ‘good 
manufacturing or agricultural practices’. The relevant industry standards/codes, that are well-established and 
widely used (such GlobalG.A.P.), are likely to influence the meaning of such general clauses and to be able to 
inject precise meaning into them. Ultimately, however, the wording of the clause and its interpretation are 
decisive. The meaning of the clause may, for example, be interpreted as not being confined to a relevant industry 
standard/code, as demonstrated by Scottish Power UK Plc v BP Exploration Operating Co Ltd & Others [2015] 
EWHC 2658 (Comm). This recent UK case involved long-term gas sales agreements requiring the seller to act as 
the ‘reasonable and prudent operator’ (ROP). The court took the view that compliance with a voluntary industry 
code of practice was not enough to meet the ROP standard. There was nothing in the definition of ROP to indicate 
that factors other than those set out in the industry code were intended to be disregarded (para [118]). 
132 See SGA, s 55; CISG, Art 6. 
133 [2002] EWCA Civ 548. 
134 However, the judge was deemed to be wrong to treat BS 4105 as containing an express term that would lead 
to the seller’s liability in damages (paras [16], [28]). 
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is the buyer who relies on the seller’s non-compliance with a standard, the key broad question 
underlying this interpretative process should be whether the seller could reasonably be 
expected to be aware of the existence of the standard and of the need to comply with it in the 
light of the prevailing market expectations in a place where the goods are intended to be used 
or sold by the buyer. A number of factors, in addition to those noted in the context of public 
standards,135 will be relevant.  
 It may be that the parties have had an established practice between themselves, with the 
seller complying with a particular standard in their past transactions. In sales laws, such as the 
CISG, that recognise the binding nature of a practice, if one is established,136 such a finding 
will lead to the contract and SITs being interpreted as imposing an obligation on the seller to 
comply with the standard. In a CISG case,137 where the buyer, who purchased vine wax to treat 
vines to reduce the risk of them becoming infected, alleged that the wax was ‘defective’. The 
German Supreme Court held that the wax ‘did not meet the industry standards…of which both 
parties were aware and which both parties applied’ and, for this reason, the wax was not in 
conformity with seemingly both the contract and the terms implied under CISG.138 Even if the 
parties’ previous conduct and transactions do not amount to a ‘practice’ in the sense that binds 
the parties to it, any such past conduct will still be a factor pointing in favour of the parties’ 
intention that the seller was to comply with a standard.139  
 The need to comply with a standard may have been communicated, expressly or 
implicitly, to the seller and, in this case, the seller is bound to comply with the standard by 
virtue of an implied term of fitness for purpose. One example of implicit communication is 
where the parties are both members of the same industry organisation or association that has 
adopted the standard. Where such an organisation or association requires its members to adopt 
its standard(s) in their business activities,140 it is highly likely that the seller will have an 
obligation to comply with the standard(s) either by virtue of the fitness for purpose test, a term 
implied in fact or even under the fall-back implied terms. If both parties are aware of each 
                                                          
135 See nn 113-124 and the accompanying main text. 
136 See Art 9(1). 
137 Federal Supreme Court, VIII ZR 121/98, 24 March 1999 (Germany), 
<http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cases/990324g1.html>. 
138 Ibid. 
139 See, eg, CISG, Art 8(3). 
140 Kingspan Environmental Ltd v Borealis A/S [2012] EWHC 1147 (Comm), para [645]. 
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other’s membership that requires compliance with the standard(s), it is difficult to see how the 
contract or SITs may be interpreted otherwise. 
 Even if membership in an organisation that has adopted a standard does not require 
compliance, the fact that the parties operate under a common industry framework is likely to 
have a strong influence on the interpretation of contract or SITs. Where only the seller is a 
member of such an organisation, imposing an obligation on the seller to meet the relevant 
standard will not be easy. In ARL Lighting (Manitoba) Ltd v Dixon ARL Lighting (Manitoba) 
Ltd, a Canadian case,141 the buyer argued that the dies supplied by the seller were not of 
merchantable quality because they did not conform to the standards of North American Die 
Casters Association (NADCA). The buyer relied on the fact that the seller, a manufacturer, was 
a member of NADCA and advertised itself as such and that the NADCA ‘logo’ was present in 
several communications before and after the conclusion of the contract. The British Columbia 
Supreme Court held that there was no breach of the merchantable quality test for three reasons. 
First, the buyer did not ‘cite any authority for the propositions that a manufacturer who 
advertises that it is a member of a group that sets standards is obliged to follow those standards 
and recommendations’.142 Secondly, it could not be said that the buyer was aware of the seller’s 
membership or, in any case, relied on that membership to assume that NADCA standards 
would be followed.143 Finally, the presence of the NADCA logo could not lead to an assumption 
or be seen as a seller’s representation that the NADCA standards would be complied with.144  
This reasoning seems harsh on the buyer. Even if there was no evidence demonstrating 
the buyer’s reliance on the seller being a member of NADCA, the seller itself placed strong 
emphasis on its membership, through its advertisement, usage of logo and even in its 
communications with the buyer. The seller’s statement – that ‘[o]ur quality program will assure 
you a product which will be acceptable to the industry’145 - also appears to acknowledge the 
need to comply with industry (NADCA) standards. Arguably, the totality of these 
circumstances should have been sufficient to generate the buyer’s reasonable expectation that 
the seller would comply with industry standards. Be that as it may, the case demonstrates that 
the mere fact of the seller’s membership in a standard setting body may not be sufficient to 
imply an obligation to comply with the relevant standard.  
                                                          
141 [1998] BCJ No 2442. 
142 Para [52]. 
143 Para [54]. 
144 Para [54]. 
145 Ibid, para [13]. 
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Despite standards being merely a factor in interpreting contracts and SITs, it is a strong 
factor. Interpreting contracts and SITs is a balancing exercise, drawing on all relevant 
circumstances. SITs may also not offer sufficiently precise benchmarks of conformity, whereas 
technical standards often contain detailed specifications and parameters that help resolve 
disputes on the basis of criteria that the industry regards as desirable or acceptable. That is why 
it is not surprising to find cases where standards have been strongly relied upon.  
In Lafarge Concrete Ltd. v. Rempel Bros. Concrete Ltd.,146 a Canadian case, non-
compliance with industry standards (the Canadian Standards Association (CSA)) was held to 
create an inference that the sand, bought by the buyer from the seller for making concrete, was 
contaminated, resulting in the concrete being ‘defective’. The burden then shifted to the seller 
to prove that the buyer’s mix design was a significant contributing factor to the defect. The 
seller was unable to do so and was found to be in breach of contract.147 Another Canadian case, 
Universal Printed Circuit Co Canada v Omni Graphics Ltd,148 went a step further and relied 
solely on an industry standard to define the meaning of SITs. The buyer purchased circuit board 
for resale and it was established that there was a relevant industry standard, providing for a 
permissible failure rate of two percent. The British Columbia Supreme Court held that this 
standard ‘would be the standard of reasonable fitness for the purpose for which the circuit 
boards were provided’ and it would ‘serve, as well, as the implied condition as to merchantable 
quality’.149 Since the goods fell well below the industry standards, the seller was in breach of 
both the fitness for purpose and merchantable quality tests. 
The ability of standards to exert strong influence on the interpretation of SITs can also 
be seen where it is the seller who relies on its compliance with a standard to demonstrate that 
no breach of SITs has been committed. In Medivance Instruments Ltd v Gaslane Pipework 
Services Ltd, Vulcana Gas Appliances Ltd,150 a UK case, the buyer, a manufacturer of x-ray 
and other equipment, argued that the seller was in breach, amongst other things, of the 
merchantable quality and fitness for purpose tests. A heater, supplied by the seller, was located 
                                                          
146 [1985] B.C.W.L.D. 3022. 
147 The decision is open to criticism that the basis of liability was not set out clearly. The seller was liable for 
delivering ‘contaminated sand’, which was presumed to cause the concrete being ‘defective’. However, 
‘contamination’ and ‘defects’ are not bases of liability in themselves. The seller’s liability ought to have been 
based on a relevant contract term or SIT, with ‘contamination’ and ‘defect’ being factors pointing to non-
compliance with SITs. The decision appears to be based on the contract interpretation analysis, although the buyer 
also relied on the merchantable quality test. 
148 85 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1193. 
149 Para [43]. 
150 [2002] EWCA Civ 500. 
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close to the cardboard boxes, which resulted in a fire that caused substantial damage to the 
buyer’s factory. The seller relied on the fact that the heater complied with the standards of the 
British Standards Institution.151 The Court of Appeal held that for the purpose of the two 
statutory tests, compliance with such standards was ‘certainly an important factor which should 
be taken into account, but it was not ‘necessarily a conclusive factor’.152 It further held that this 
factor was particularly important for the application of the merchantability test because neither 
the standard nor the merchantability test was concerned with a particular purpose for which the 
goods were intended to be used. However, it was not irrelevant to the fitness for purpose test, 
‘albeit the more unusual and exceptional circumstances of the particular use, the less may be 
the force of the argument that the article complies with the British Standard’.153 Compliance 
with the standard strongly influenced the decision that the seller was not in breach of the 
merchantability test.154 For the same reason, the seller was also not in breach of the fitness for 
purpose test because the specific purpose in this case was no different from the ‘general run of 
purposes’ covered by the merchantability test.155  
The decision also helpfully explains the relationship between standards and the 
merchantability test by identifying cases and factors that may point to the goods being 
unmerchantable, despite complying with a standard. These cases are where: the standard was 
prepared at a time when a defect or a problem in question was not known; a standard is not 
concerned with a defect or problem at hand; or a standard is ‘too low or deficient in a certain 
aspect’.156 The latter point appears to reflect the fact that courts have some benchmark of 
conformity in mind when defining the seller’s obligations. There must be some reference point 
against which a standard will be deemed ‘too low or deficient’; and it is normally the fall-back 
statutory terms, such as ‘satisfactory’ or ‘merchantable’ quality, that will provide the basis for 
setting that benchmark. Thus, in John Handrigan v Apex Warwick, Inc,157 a US case, involving 
                                                          
151 ‘an independent non-profit making body, incorporated…to undertake the preparation and promulgation of 
standards for the production of goods and the provision of certification and testing (para [27]).  
152 Para [34]. 
153 Para [34]. 
154 ‘The fact that the Heater complied with the British Standard is…of strong assistance to the respondents so far 
as merchantability is concerned’ (para [38]). 
155 ‘the Judge accepted expert evidence…to the effect that the use of the Heater “in a well-run storeroom poses no 
significantly greater degree of risk compared to its use in other well-run commercial environments”. He went on 
to say that, while the packing area contained combustible materials, it was not large, there was no mechanical 
handling, and “the quality of management of the store was generally high”. He expressed himself “satisfied the 
degree of risk does not require the installation of a different sort of heater than that provided”’ (para [39]). 
156 Para [37]. 
157 275 A.2d 262 (1971). 
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a claim brought by a man who fell off a ladder bought from a buyer, the Supreme Court of 
Rhode Island held that:  
The fact that the ladder met all the specifications of the American Standard Safety Code 
does not establish as a matter of law that the ladder was fit for the ordinary purposes 
for which ladders are used. The expert’s testimony that the ladder was ‘too weak’ and 
‘unsafe’ raised a question of fact, and we hold that the trial justice correctly submitted 
the case to the jury so that they could determine, on all the evidence, the question of 
fitness under the Uniform Commercial Code.158  
Whilst the fall-back statutory tests closely inter-relate with industry standards, they are 
ultimately standalone tests, imbued with independent meaning which can be influenced by 
industry standards only in appropriate cases. The fall-back tests thus inevitably set and promote 
a minimum threshold of quality in a society, arguably acquiring a regulatory feature.159 Whilst 
lacking in precision, they are not without content and are based on the body of case law that 
injects layers of meaning into them.  
 
2. Ethical standards 
 
Ethical standards, such as those concerned with human rights, labour standards and working 
conditions, environmental protection, transparency and corruption, have become much more 
prominent in the world today than they have ever been. The question for sales law is whether 
a seller is required by a contract and/or terms implied in law to ensure compliance with such 
standards. In contrast with standards that concern physical characteristics of the goods, ethical 
standards mainly concern the process surrounding the making of the goods. The goods may be 
perfect in terms of their physical properties, but may have been produced in poor working 
conditions, with the use of child labour or bad environmental practices. Are these goods non-
conforming? 
 It is increasingly recognised that conformity concerns not only the goods’ physical 
properties, but also their relationship with an environment in which they are used or sold.160 
                                                          
158 Ibid, 265. 
159 See, further, Saidov (n 111) 492, 496.  
160 I Schwenzer in I Schwenzer (ed), Schlecthriem and Schwenzer, Commentary on the UN Convention on the 
International Sale of Goods (CISG) (3rd edn, OUP 2010) Art 35, para 9. 
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Ethical standards can be an important part of such an environment. However, the mere 
existence of ethical standards does not mean that they become a source of defining the seller’s 
obligations. As with other standards, this issue depends on the how contracts and SITs are 
interpreted in the particular circumstances and in the light of the relevant factors, many of 
which have already been mentioned.161 In addition, other considerations, specific to the context 
of ethical standards, need to be borne in mind. 
 Many companies today adopt their own codes of conduct,162 containing ethical 
standards, as developed by them and/or as defined in: international instruments (e.g., 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) Conventions,163 UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child164 or the Universal Declaration of Human Rights165); international initiatives (e.g., the 
UN Global Compact (UNGC),166 the ‘Kimberly Process’ (KP)167); non-governmental 
organisations’ documentation (e.g., ISO 14001168 or SA8000169); or industry coalitions’ 
documents (e.g., Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC)170). These standards are 
often expressly incorporated into contracts and where this is the case, compliance with them is 
                                                          
161 See nn 113-124 and the accompanying main text. 
162 The majority of top 500 companies in the US and the UK have adopted some kind of code of conduct 
(<http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/introduction-to-international-labour-standards/international-labour-
standards-use/lang--en/index.htm>). 
163 See, eg, Apple Supplier Code of Conduct: ‘Supplier shall employ only workers who are at least 15 years of age 
or the applicable minimum legal age, whichever is higher. Supplier may provide legitimate workplace 
apprenticeship programs for educational benefit that are consistent with Article 6 of ILO Minimum Age 
Convention No. 138 or light work consistent with Article 7 of ILO Minimum Age Convention No. 138’ 
(<https://www.apple.com/supplier-responsibility/pdfs/supplier_code_of_conduct.pdf>). 
164 See, eg, Ericsson Code of Conduct, <http://www.ericsson.com/res/thecompany/docs/corporate-
responsibility/codeofconduct.pdf>. 
165 See, eg, Sony Group Code of Conduct, <http://www.sony.net/SonyInfo/csr_report/compliance/index3.html>. 
166 UNGC is the largest voluntary international corporate sustainability initiative, comprising 8,000 companies 
and 4,000 non-business organisations. The UNGC’s Ten Principles concern human rights, labour, environment 
and anti-corruption. See: <https://www.unglobalcompact.org/>. 
167 KP is a ‘joint governments, industry and civil society initiative to stem the flow of conflict diamonds – rough 
diamonds used by rebel movements to finance wars against legitimate governments’ 
(<http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/>). 
168 ‘The ISO 14000 family of standards provides practical tools for companies and organizations of all kinds 
looking to manage their environmental responsibilities’ (http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards/management-
standards/iso14000.htm) 
169 This standard has been produced by Social Accountability International, a non-governmental organisation 
aimed at implementing socially responsible standards. SA8000 is ‘one of the world’s first auditable social 
certification standards for decent workplaces, across all industrial sectors. It is based on the UN Declaration of 
Human Rights, conventions of the ILO, UN and national law, and spans industry and corporate codes to create a 
common language to measure social performance’ (<http://www.sa-
intl.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.ViewPage&pageId=1689>).  
170 ‘The EICC Code of Conduct is a set of standards on social, environmental and ethical issues in the electronics 
industry supply chain. The standards set out in the Code of Conduct reference international norms and standards 
including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ILO International Labor Standards, OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises, ISO and SA standards, and many more’ (<http://www.eiccoalition.org/standards/code-
of-conduct/>). 
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the seller’s contractual obligation. Standards are usually incorporated either by reference,171 
where the contract refers to the relevant document, or are themselves expressly set out in the 
contract.172 
It is more difficult to determine whether the seller has an obligation to comply with any 
such standards where there is no express contractual provision to that effect. The first case to 
be addressed is where both parties are members of a voluntary initiative, such as the UNGC. If 
the contract is silent on the need to comply with any ethical standards, can a term be implied 
in it that the seller ought to comply with the UNGC because both parties are members of this 
initiative? Before addressing this question, it is worth mentioning that membership in the 
UNGC requires participating companies to produce an annual Communication on Progress 
(COP) that sets out the details of the work that a company has done to implement the UNGC 
Principles in its strategies and operations and to support ‘societal priorities’:173 
‘The COP is a visible expression of [a company’s] commitment to sustainability and 
[its] stakeholders can view it on [the company’s] profile page. Companies that fail to 
report or to meet the criteria over time may be removed from the initiative’.174  
As explained, it seems that to imply a term that compliance with the UNGC was expected both 
the common law and the CISG require that such compliance be essential to the parties and their 
contract.175  
Whether that is the case may, to some the extent, depend on whether a contract is seen 
as a regulatory vehicle for implementing and promoting ethical values in a society.176 If so, 
courts may be inclined to give an affirmative answer. Even if the issue is viewed outside any 
possible regulatory function of a contract, it can still be argued that there are good reasons for 
inferring the parties’ intention that the seller will comply with the UNGC.177 Membership in 
the UNGC represents a public declaration of commitment to implement the values enshrined 
in this document, as is evidenced by the requirement to produce an annual COP. Business is 
                                                          
171 In English law, one party’s terms can be incorporated by reference provided that reasonable notice of them has 
been given to the other (see, eg, H Beale (ed), Chitty on Contracts (32nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell-Thomson Reuters 
2015) vol I, paras 13-013-13-014).  
172 See, further, Rümkorf (n 28) 87-88, giving examples.  
173 See <https://www.unglobalcompact.org/participation/report>. 
174 Ibid. 
175 See nn 75-79 and the accompanying main text.   
176 ‘necessity for business efficacy involves a value judgment’ (Marks and Spencer plc v BNP Paribas Securities 
Services Trust Company (Jersey) Ltd (n 77) para [21] (Lord Neuberger)). 
177 See Schwenzer and Leisinger (n 94) 263-264, treating the UNGC as a trade usage to which the parties can be 
presumed to have agreed under CISG, Art 9(1).  
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conducted through contracts and a company can hardly be regarded as committed to 
implementing the UNGC if it is not ensuring that these standards are incorporated into its 
contracts.178 This argument is stronger if both parties are aware of each other’s membership in 
the UNGC, making it likely that compliance with the UNGC was reasonably expected by both 
parties.  
So far as SITs are concerned, it can be contended that membership of both parties in 
the same initiative should be sufficient to communicate to the seller a particular purpose that 
the UNGC standards are to be complied with,179 triggering the fitness for purpose test. It may 
be more difficult to infer such an obligation through the fall-back tests. Compliance with ethical 
values may not be an obstacle to the goods’ being resaleable or used in some other ordinary 
way (e.g., in the manufacturing process). That said, much will depend on an environment in 
which the goods are sold or used. If it is a market or an environment where compliance with 
standards, such as the UNGC, is expected, it can be argued that, in that environment, the goods 
are not of merchantable or satisfactory quality or are not fit for their ordinary or common 
purposes. 
Another case is where only one party has expressed its commitment to ethical standards, 
usually in its code of conduct. Whether such standards become terms of the contract depends 
on the applicable rules of incorporation of terms. Briefly, in English law, such (written) terms 
can become part of the contract if they are contained in a document which the receiving party 
or a reasonable person would expect to contain contractual terms180 and notice of them was 
given at or before the conclusion of the contract;181 or there is a course of dealing between the 
parties ‘where each party has led the other reasonably to believe that he intended that their 
rights and liabilities should be ascertained by reference to the terms of a document which had 
been consistently used by them in previous transactions’.182 In the context of the CISG, a 
reasonable opportunity to take notice of a party’s terms must similarly be given to the other 
                                                          
178 For a contrary view, see C Ramberg, ‘Emotional Non-Conformity in the International Sale of Goods, 
Particularly in Relation to CSR-Policies and Codes of Conduct’ in I Schwenzer and L Spagnolo (eds), Boundaries 
and Intersections: 5th Annual Schlechtriem CISG Conference (Eleven International Publishing 2014) 80 (‘It is one 
thing to generally participate and sponsor a United Nations Initiative. It is another thing to contractually agree that 
a contractual party is entitled to contractual remedies if an ethical standard is not met’). 
179 See n 140 and the accompanying main text. 
180 See, eg, Parker c South Eastern Railway (1877) 2 CPD 416; Thompson v London, Midland and Scottish 
Railway Co Ltd [1930] 1 KB 41. 
181 See, eg, Olley v Marlborough Council [1949] 1 KB 532. 
182 Chitty (n 171) para 13-011. 
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party in order for any intention to incorporate terms to be inferred.183 If there has been a practice 
between the parties to comply with certain terms in the past, it will also give rise to the seller’s 
duty to comply with them.184  
All this means that the question of whether a party’s code of conduct has become part 
of the contract depends on the circumstances and no general conclusions can be reached. What 
can be highlighted are a number of factors relevant in ascertaining the parties’ intentions, such 
as the price of the goods or whether a party can be taken to have relied on the other party’s 
terms.185 The very fact that the contract is silent on the need to comply with a buyer’s code of 
conduct is likely to work against the buyer, who claims that the seller’s non-compliance with 
the buyer’s code is a breach of contract. If the buyer felt strongly about its standards and 
intended the seller to comply with them, why did it not incorporate its code into the contract or 
refrain from entering into one if the seller resisted such incorporation?186 This point is 
particularly strong in the context of global supply chains where the end-buyers are often the 
ones setting the standards throughout the chain. A failure of a powerful and sophisticated 
commercial party to expressly incorporate its code of conduct into the contract points to the 
intention not to require the seller to comply with its code. A contract providing for the auditing 
and inspection processes may be indicative of the parties’ implicit intention to incorporate a 
party’s (usually, the end-buyer in the chain) code of conduct because it is through the 
inspection, certification and auditing schemes that buyers seek to ensure compliance across the 
chain.187  
On balance, proving that a buyer’s code of conduct has been incorporated into a contract 
does not appear to be easy. Ethical standards reflect moral convictions, which means that the 
contractual silence poses difficulties for a buyer seeking to rely on the seller’s non-compliance 
with ethical standards. This also means that establishing a breach of SITs, particularly fitness 
                                                          
183 See Rules 2 and 3 of the CISG-Advisory Council (CISG-AC) Opinion No 13, Inclusion of Standard Terms 
under the CISG, <http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/CISG-AC-op13.html>.  
184 See CISG, Arts 8(3) and 9(1). Even if prior course of dealing does not amount to a ‘practice’, it must still be 
taken into account in interpreting the parties’ intentions (see Art 8(3)). 
185 See, generally, Saidov (n 71) 35-37. 
186 See P Schlechtriem, ‘Non-Material Damages – Recovery under the CISG?’ (2007) 19 Pace Int’l L Rev 89, 
100-101. 
187 See Ramberg (n 178) 81. But, as Ramberg notes, this will not necessarily be the case: ‘In some situations…the 
supplier could successfully argue that he perceived the auditing procedures only as a means for the purchaser to 
determine whether he wishes to continue to purchase goods from the supplier – and that he did not perceive the 
auditing procedures to imply that he was liable for production methods contrary to the purchaser’s [Corporate 
Social Responsibility] policy’ (ibid). 
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for purpose which borders closely with contract interpretation,188 should not be allowed to 
become a different and easier189 route for the buyer to establish the seller’s liability.190 It is 
advisable therefore that the interpretation of contract and of the fitness for purpose test be 
applied with the same level of rigour,191 unless there are additional factors pointing to the 
communication of a particular purpose. One such factor can be the buyer’s business identity 
and well-established reputation, based on its adherence to ethical standards. This can be the 
case, for example, where the seller knows that the buyer always sells goods at markets, 
specialising in organic or fair trade products, or where the focus on ethical standards is evident 
from the name of the buyer’s business.192 However, these factors can be equally important to 
contract interpretation and therefore their presence can lead to the same result being achieved 
by both the contractual implication of a term and the fitness for purpose test. Similarly, fall-
back tests are unlikely to lead to the seller’s liability merely because the buyer has declared its 
commitment to certain ethical standards in its code of conduct. It is only where the overall 
environment, within which parties operate, is well-known for adherence to similar standards 
that the goods may become unmerchantable, of unsatisfactory quality or unfit for their 
ordinary193 use. 
This discussion is, generally, applicable to the case where the buyer relies on the seller’s 
code of conduct being part of the contract. Nevertheless, somewhat different considerations 
also arise. There will be tension between a seller’s declaration of commitment to ethical 
standards and its argument that it did not have a contractual obligation to comply with them. 
There may also be policy reasons for implying a contractual obligation, considering that by 
making declarations of commitment to certain standards, companies will often want to induce 
the public as a whole to do business with them. It can be argued that such sellers should be held 
liable to protect the public and encourage sellers to stay true to their public representations.194 
A buyer’s reasonable reliance on the seller’s standards, whilst not decisive, acquires particular 
significance and can point in favour of the seller’s code being part of the contract. The seller’s 
                                                          
188 See the main text accompanying nn 81-83.  
189 The communication of a particular purpose is a lower threshold than implying a term into a contract (see nn 
82-83).  
190 Bridge (n 70) para 7.85. 
191 In any case, the requirement of communicating a particular purpose is surely not met merely because a buyer 
has publicly proclaimed its adherence to a code of conduct and the seller is aware of that. 
192 See Schwenzer and Leisinger (n 94) 266. 
193 As understood in that particular environment. 
194 See Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR), Comment A on Art 2:303, in C von Bar and E Clive (eds), 
Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law: Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) 
(Munich, Sellier European Law Publishers, 2009) vol II, 1296. 
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identity and reputation are also important. If it has a well-established reputation and identity as 
‘ethical business’, reflected in its corporate name and/or brands of its products, this factor adds 
strength to the argument that ethical standards in its code of conduct are part of the contract. 
Ultimately, the parties’ intentions are crucial and there need to be circumstances from which 
the seller’s reasonable intention to assume a contractual obligation to comply with its code can 
be inferred.  
SITs are less useful to the buyer than in the case of the buyer’s reliance on its own code 
of conduct. In contrast with the case where the buyer’s code of conduct and/or its business 
identity/reputation can themselves be a way of communicating a particular purpose, the seller’s 
code of conduct or business identity/reputation195 are hardly relevant for communicating a 
particular purpose to the seller.196 In other respects, the above discussion of factors relevant to 
the fitness for purpose and the fall-back tests is equally applicable in this context.197 
 
3. Minimum ethical standards in sales contracts? 
 
It has been argued that the notions of conformity or quality should comprise non-physical 
characteristics of the goods, such as whether ethical standards were complied with in their 
manufacture or production processes.198 Indeed, there is increasing recognition that conformity 
comprises the relationship of the goods with their surrounding environment and that, at its core, 
conformity is about what the buyer can reasonably expect from the goods.199 Bearing in mind 
the consumers’ awareness of ethical issues, it can be argued that many buyers today expect 
goods to comply with various ethical standards. This line of reasoning does not necessarily 
mean that every sales contract and/or SITs must always be interpreted as imposing an 
                                                          
195 However, this factor will be highly relevant to establishing the buyer’s reasonable reliance on the seller’s skill 
and judgment for the purpose of the fitness for purpose test (see n 83). 
196 Although it is conceivable that the buyer may argue that the very fact that it has entered into a contract with a 
seller, known for its ethical standards, is a way of communicating a particular purpose that the goods were to 
comply with such standards. 
197 See the main text accompanying nn 192-193 above. 
198 See, generally, H Collins, ‘Conformity of Goods, the Network Society, and the Ethical Consumer’ (2014) 5 
European Rev Private L 619; I Schwenzer, ‘Conformity of the Goods – Physical Features on Wane?’ in I 
Schwenzer and L Spagnolo (eds), State of Play: The 3rd Annual MAA Schlechtriem CISG Conference (Eleven 
International Publishing 2012) 103-106; K Maley, ‘The Limits to the Conformity of Goods in the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG)’ (2009) 12 Int’l Trade Business L Rev 82. 
199 See, eg, Collins (n 198) 633 (‘In UK law, the replacement of the standard of merchantable quality with that of 
‘satisfactory quality’ shifted the focus away from the seller’s promise and the inherent qualities of the goods to 
the expectations of the consumer to acquire a product that satisfied her’). 
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obligation to comply with ethical standards. Rather, it seems to encourage the legal community 
to be ready and willing to interpret contracts and SITs with reference to such standards, where 
appropriate, in the light of the buyer’s reasonable expectations. These expectations are to be 
inferred from a given factual scenario, commercial context and a broader environment, 
surrounding the contract.200 Even so, sales contracts and SITs acquire regulatory features 
because they become instruments of promoting values and protecting interests going well 
beyond the interests of the two contracting parties.201  
 There have, however, been more radical proposals, which, if adopted, would turn sales 
contracts and SITs into a truly regulatory tool. It has been argued that some minimum ethical 
standards, such as the ‘prohibition of child labor’, ‘forced and compulsory labor’ and 
‘minimum labor conditions’, should be implied in every sales contract.202 With the argument 
having made in the context of the CISG, the suggested legal mechanism for achieving this 
result is to treat such minimum standards as a trade usage, which the parties will be considered 
to ‘have impliedly made applicable to their contract or its formation’203 and which is further 
defined in the CISG as one ‘of which the parties knew or ought to have known and which in 
international trade is widely known to, and regularly observed by, parties to contracts of the 
type involved in the particular trade concerned’.204 Underlying this proposal is a strong sense 
that certain ethical standards are so important that they must be applied universally and that 
sales contracts and sales law should be a vehicle for promoting and implementing these 
standards as well as a tool for empowering buyers, and ultimately consumers, to enforce 
minimum ethical standards.205 
 Whilst several instances of where arguably sales law manifests regulatory features have 
already been noted, the question is whether expanding this function to incorporate ethical 
standards is justifiable. There are arguments, challenging the proposition that an international 
sales law should be a channel for promoting ethical standards. One is that doing so would 
stretch the functions of sales law too far, considering that its main role is to allocate risks 
                                                          
200 ‘carbon dioxide might be unsuitable for industrial food application, simply because it included an ingredient 
which the media or public perceived as the product of sweated labour in a producer country’ (Messer UK Ltd v 
Britvic Soft Drinks Ltd (n 133) para [14]). 
201 See Collins (n 198) 623, 639, taking a similar view and challenging ‘the traditional division of labour between 
contract law and public regulation with respect to labour rights’ (ibid, 623). 
202 Schwenzer and Leisinger (n 94) 264. These commentators, however, qualify this proposition by stating that 
minimum ethical standards should not be implied where a contract price is ‘so low that ethical production 
standards are impossible to be applied’.  
203 CISG, Art 9(2). 
204 Ibid. 
205 See, similarly, Collins (n 198) 639. 
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between the contracting parties primarily on the basis of commercial, rather than moral, 
considerations. Another is that not all ethical standards are necessarily universal: 
it should be considered whether and to what extent the public at large, in the setting of 
global trade, shares certain ethical values clearly and overwhelmingly, or whether the 
condemnation of certain production methods only reflect social standards of affluent 
minorities wanting to do good, and whose members can easily do without the goods in 
question. It is also uncertain to what extent all members of this group share the same 
convictions…206 
An obvious danger, highlighted by this quotation, is that moral convictions, shared by some, 
may be imposed, through sales law and contracts, on those who might not share them. Care 
must be taken to ensure that if an international sales law is to promote and protect ethical 
standards worldwide, these standards are accepted globally.  
Yet another point is this: even where some ethical standards have achieved wide 
international recognition, does it follow that they amount to an international trade usage? For 
example, there has been wide acceptance of and global commitment207 to such standards as 
prohibition of child labour, as evidenced by a high number of ratifications of international 
conventions, protecting the rights of children.208 However, nearly global acceptance of this 
standard by states does not mean that it is ‘regularly observed’ by companies around the world, 
as is the CISG’s requirement in respect of a usage. More so, the recent data – according to 
which 168 million children worldwide are in child labour (almost eleven per cent of the entire 
child population)209 - suggests that businesses, particularly in the poorest parts of the world,210 
are far from regularly observing these standards. Whilst the CISG has been interpreted by 
courts as not requiring the universal observance of a usage, but only that it should be observed 
                                                          
206 Schlecthriem (n 186) 97. 
207 See <http://www.unicef.org/crc/>. 
208 194 countries are parties to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which is the highest number of 
ratifications received by a human rights treaty (see <http://www.unicef.org/crc/index_30225.html>). The ILO 
Convention No. 138 on the Minimum Age for Admission to Employment (1973) has been ratified by 156 countries 
and the Convention No. 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labour (1999) has been ratified by 173 countries (see 
<http://www.un.org/en/globalissues/briefingpapers/childlabour/intlconvs.shtml>). 
209 International Labour Office, Making Progress against Child Labour: Global Estimates and Trends 2000-2012 
(Geneva, International Labour Organization 2013) vii (<http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/-
--ipec/documents/publication/wcms_221513.pdf>). 
210 See, eg, J Moulds, ‘Child Labour in the Fashion Supply Chain: Where, Why and What Can Be Done’, 
<http://labs.theguardian.com/unicef-child-labour/>. 
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by a majority of companies,211 the conditions, sadly, have not yet ripened for it to be justifiable 
to suggest that the prohibition of child labour is an international trade usage.  
 Such trade usages may, however, exist in the particular trade or commercial sectors. 
Take the already mentioned EICC, which comprises more than one hundred electronics 
companies, probably including all major companies.212 Not only do the EICC members 
subscribe and are held accountable to a common Code of Conduct213 but many of them have 
also adopted their own Codes of Conduct.214 In addition to the EICC members, thousands of 
suppliers of those companies are required to implement the EICC Code.215 Against this 
background, it is arguable216 that the ethical standards, including the prohibition of child 
labour,217 in the EICC Code and the Codes of Conduct of individual companies, based on the 
EICC Code, constitute trade usages that are ‘widely known to and regularly observed by’ 
companies in the electronics sector. Where the CISG governs an electronic product supply 
contract,218 an argument can be made that a seller, even it has not subscribed to the EICC 
Code,219 has an implied obligation to comply with the standards in the EICC Code,220 unless it 
is excluded by the contract.221  
 The debate about whether sales law should be a vehicle for promoting ethical standards 
and whether minimum standards are to be implied in every sales contract is likely to continue 
in the years to come.222 Reaching an agreement is easier in the context of domestic law than in 
the context of the CISG, which must reflect global ‘common ground’. The interpretation of 
                                                          
211 See Supreme Court, 2 Ob 191/98x, 15 October 1998 (Austria), 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/981015a3.html>; Supreme Court, 10 Ob 344/99g, 21 March 2000 (Austria), 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/000321a3.html>. 
212 Such as Apple, Dell Inc, Hewlett-Packard, HTC Corp, IBM Corporation, Intel Corporation, LG Electronics, 
Microsoft, Philips, Samsung Electronics, Texas Instruments, Toshiba Corp. and others. See 
<http://www.eiccoalition.org/about/members/>. 
213 See <http://www.eiccoalition.org/about/>. 
214 See G Nimbalker et al, ‘The Truth Behind the Barcode: Electronic Industry Trend’, 
<http://www.baptistworldaid.org.au/assets/BehindtheBarcode/Electronics-Industry-Trends-Report-
Australia.pdf>, 15, for the results of a survey of 39 members of the EICC, according to which 82 per cent out of 
those companies have a code of conduct that covers core ILO principles.  
215 See <http://www.eiccoalition.org/about/members/>. 
216 See S Wilson, ‘Ethical Standards in International Sales Contracts: Can the CISG be Used to Prevent Child 
Labour?’, <http://researcharchive.vuw.ac.nz/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10063/4622/thesis.pdf?sequence=2>. 
217 See EICC Code, 2, prohibiting the use of child labour ‘in any stage of manufacturing’ 
(<http://www.eiccoalition.org/media/docs/EICCCodeofConduct5_English.pdf>). 
218 The same reasoning can be used if a contract is governed by domestic law.  
219 Liability will arise in this case by virtue of CISG, Art 9(2). 
220 For those parties who have subscribed to the EICC Code, liability may arise either under CISG, Art 9(1) or 
9(2). 
221 See CISG, Art 6. 
222 See, similarly, Bridge (n 70) para 7.112. 
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domestic law is likely to be shaped by public expectations in the respective country and these 
expectations are easier to gauge and identify than in the worldwide context. If the future policy 
direction becomes such that the minimum ethical standards will be expected to be complied 
with in every sales contract, SITs will be the main vehicle for imposing such an obligation; not 
least because being implied in law, they are conceptually best suited to performing regulatory 
functions. Such fall-back tests as merchantable or satisfactory quality are, by definition, based 
on some benchmark of quality,223 which is flexible enough to cover and expand into an ethical 
dimension. A similar result can be achieved through the fitness for purpose test. An 
environment, where there is an overwhelming public expectation as regards some minimum 
ethical standards, can itself become a source of communicating that expectation to the seller 
and translating it into an obligation in every contract.224 This approach, however, will inevitably 
introduce automaticity into the application of SITs, whereas they have been largely designed 
to respond to the particularities of each case.  
 
III. Sales law and discourse on standards outside it 
 
Now that the response of sales laws to standards has been examined, it is time to ask whether 
and how this experience can contribute to the discourse on standards outside sales law and vice 
versa. Some broad directions emerge. First, several instances have been noted where sales law 
appears to have acquired regulatory features, such as where the rules on conformity: inevitably 
promote minimum benchmarks of quality225 and even some moral considerations, such as 
equality between developed and developing countries;226 become a conduit through which 
public law requirements influence the definition of the seller’s obligations;227 being capable of 
                                                          
223 See nn 156-159 and the accompanying main text. 
224 ‘If concern about [labour] standards on the part of consumers were ever to become more widespread than they 
are now, a more convincing case could be made that goods manufactured in breach of such standards were 
generally unfit for purpose’ (see Bridge (n 70) para 7.112 (emphasis added)). Bridge argues that in the 
environment, where such a concern is not yet widespread, the seller’s liability under the fitness for purpose tests 
in SGA, s. 14(3), is easier to establish if the buyer is an intermediate buyer than if it is the end buyer in the chain. 
In the former case, the seller should be liable under s. 14(3) ‘given the buyer’s purpose of resale and the, by now, 
well-known reaction against [bad] labour practices on the part of a large section of the consuming public’. In the 
latter case, the end buyer will have to make a more difficult case that ‘a failure to comply with public standards 
meant that the goods supplied could not be used with ease and peace of mind and therefore were in a general sense 
unfit for purpose, so that the seller would be liable even if the buyer did not disclose his concerns at the time the 
goods were supplied’ (ibid). 
225 See the main text accompanying n 159. 
226 See the main text accompanying n 103. 
227 See the main text accompanying n 111. 
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incorporating ethical standards, thereby promoting and protecting interests going far beyond 
the contract at hand.228 It will be recalled that the discourse outside sales law suggests that, in 
global supply chains, contracts, incorporating standards, have become ‘transnational regulatory 
regimes’. This is a valuable insight for sales law. It highlights yet another instance where sales 
and contract law, that underpin and provide a framework for the interpretation and enforcement 
of contracts, perform a regulatory function. At the same time, showing that sales law is no 
stranger to regulation can only reinforce the argument that it performs this function in global 
supply chains. These lines of argument in sales law and in the broader discourse on standards 
thus reinforce each other. 
 Secondly, it has been argued that the phenomenon of standardisation, of which the 
proliferation of standards is one main form,229 is in itself a source of regulation, a form of 
‘organised governance’.230 Standardisation has been seen to affect ‘individual rights in a away 
equivalent to legislation’ as well as to ‘open up new avenues for enforcement of contracts by 
private actors themselves’.231 The experience of sales law shows the need to temper this 
argument to some extent. Commercial dealings are based on contracts. If sellers do not comply 
with standards, it is remedies available in contract and sales law that are the main mechanism 
of enforcing the buyers’ rights. The experience of jurisdictions examined here shows that the 
number of cases involving standards, particularly private, is relatively low, considering a 
substantial amount of case law on conformity of goods.232 If standards were truly a form of 
organised governance and a major source of transnational regulation, why have standards 
generated such a modest number of cases? If standards are so widely incorporated, as they are 
claimed to be, why are there virtually no cases on breach of ‘express warranties’ concerning 
standards? This applies with a particular force to ethical standards, on which not a single case 
                                                          
228 See the main text accompanying nn 60, 201 
229 The proliferation of standard form contracts being another. 
230 Brunsson and Jacobsson (n 26). 
231 D Wielsch, ‘Global Law’s Toolbox: How Standards Form Contracts’ in H. Eidenmüller (ed), Regulatory 
Competition in Contract Law and Dispute Resolution (CH Beck-Hart-Nomos 2013) 73 (in the context of standard 
form contracts). 
232 As of the time of writing, there were more than 500 reported cases on conformity of goods decided under the 
CISG (see <http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cgi-
bin/isearch?DATABASE=cases2&SEARCH_TYPE=ADVANCED&ISEARCH_TERM=articles/35&ELEME
NT_SET=TITLE&MAXHITS=500>). In the context of the UCC, it is estimated that there are ‘thousands, perhaps 
tens of thousands, of cases’ on the merchantable quality and fitness for purpose tests only (JJ White and RS 
Summers, Uniform Commercial Code (6th edn, West – Thomson Reuters 2010) 483). Against this data, it is 
striking how few cases, involving standards, have arisen. 
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has been found. Surely, if compliance with standards, including ethical standards, were so 
important to commercial buyers,233 they would enforce them more frequently and vigorously.  
One response is that parties may prefer resorting to the enforcement mechanisms 
outside the realm of the traditional contract and sales law remedies. In global supply chains, in 
particular, contracts often contain their own remedial schemes that seek to prevent non-
compliance from occurring or to make parties within a chain to co-operate before or after any 
non-compliance.234 The already mentioned certification and inspection processes are an 
important part of such remedial schemes:  
‘Certification schemes reflect a different logic from that deployed in current contract 
law: they induce cooperation and require corrective measures to a much higher degree. 
They focus on compliance rather than breach and on cure rather than compensation’.235 
It may also be that, being concerned with reputational damage, companies prefer to keep 
problems (particularly those concerned with ethical standards), relating to their production 
processes, confidential and seek to avoid litigation.236 Nevertheless, the experience of sales 
laws in several jurisdictions and of a major international instrument, applied worldwide, cannot 
be completely brushed aside by these arguments. The message from sales law is that the extent 
to which standardisation and standards represent a source of actual governance of commercial 
affairs may not be as significant as is often presented in scholarship outside sales law. In 
relation to ethical standards in particular, the experience of sales law raises doubts about 
whether, despite numerous codes of conduct, companies take them sufficiently seriously. One 
mere statistic regarding the use of child labour237 suffices to show that the world is far from 
meeting such standards. 
 Finally, there are other areas where sales law and discourse about standards outside it 
can be useful to each other. The research about the nature and functions of standards, the extent 
to which they are used in practice and the realities of their application, is useful to sales law. It 
explains the commercial context against which contracts and SITs are to be interpreted. 
Conversely, the sales law cases involving standards can contribute to the body of knowledge 
                                                          
233 In contrast, class actions have been brought in the US under consumer protection laws. See, eg, D Wallace, 
‘Seller Beware: A Look at Liability Risk for the Labour Practices of Business Partners in the Global Supply 
Chain’, <http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=895b1249-54d1-4710-9437-5c639609ad3f>.  
234 See, generally, F Cafaggi and P Iamiceli, ‘Contracting in Global Supply Chains and Cooperative Remedies’ 
(2015) Uniform L Rev 135. 
235 Ibid, 149. 
236 Lin (n 61) 725-726. 
237 See n 209 and the accompanying main text. 
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on standards more generally.238 To determine whether a standard should be a source of defining 
the seller’s obligations, standards will often have to be scrutinised. This scrutiny may reveal 
various aspects of standards, including their legitimacy, standing in a relevant commercial 
sector and the extent to which they take account of different interests involved. This means that 
positions that courts take in respect of a standard – that is, if a standard is or is not relied upon 
– can contribute to the debates surrounding standards. In the context of the CISG in particular, 
which incorporates239 the ideals of the New International Economic Order,240 the needs of 
developing countries can be, as seen above,241 a relevant consideration in a dispute on 
conformity of goods. It is not inconceivable therefore that future cases can reveal whether a 
particular standard takes into account the interests of the developing world, contributing to the 
debate about the legitimacy of standards from this perspective.242 There are thus a number of 
areas where sales law and the discourse on standards outside it would benefit from engaging 
with each other. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The last few decades have seen the proliferation of product standards created by various bodies. 
Whilst standards emanating from states continue to be important, it is ‘private’ standards that 
are gaining particular prominence, often replacing ‘public’ standards or being more rigorous 
than the latter. The accumulation and ever expanding nature of all these standards and the 
phenomenon of standardisation more generally have generated much discussion in legal and 
non-legal scholarship. However, the experience of the law of sale of goods with its body of 
case law on ‘conformity’ or ‘quality’ of the goods, has featured very little in this discussion. 
More so, there has not been enough research done in sales law itself to examine the impact of 
                                                          
238 For good examples of cases where standards are examined in some detail, see, eg, Medivance Instruments Ltd 
v Gaslane Pipework Services Ltd, Vulcana Gas Appliances Ltd (n 150); Kingspan Environmental Ltd v Borealis 
A/S (n 140). 
239 See the Preamble to the CISG. 
240 Such as equality, fairness, economic advancement and social growth of all people and eliminating the gap 
between the developed and developing world. See the UN General Assembly Resolution 3201 (S-VI): 
‘Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order’, 1 May 1974, <http://www.un-
documents.net/s6r3201.htm>.   
241 See n 101. 
242 See nn 49-53 and the accompanying main text. 
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standards on contract interpretation and SITs. This article addressed both these issues by 
drawing on the experience of the common law and the CISG.  
The conclusion, flowing this experience, is that whilst standards can influence the 
interpretation of contracts and SITs, their precise legal significance depends on the balance of 
various factors, identified in this article, in the particular circumstances. It has been argued that 
this balancing exercise should be driven and informed by the broad question of whether the 
seller was in the position to know about the relevant standard and the need to comply with it 
and, where relevant, by the logic and rationale of the applicable SIT(s). It has also been 
suggested that there is much to be gained from greater engagement between the discussions of 
standards in sales law and outside it. There are a number of areas where the body of knowledge 
and experience in each of the discourses on standards can be mutually relevant and useful. 
 
 
